A Method to Detect AAC Audio Forgery by Liu, Qingzhong et al.
Georgia Southern University
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern
Information Technology, Department of - Faculty
Publications Information Technology, Department of
8-3-2015
A Method to Detect AAC Audio Forgery
Qingzhong Liu
Sam Houston State University
Andrew Sung
University of Southern Mississippi
Lei Chen
Georgia Southern University, lchen@georgiasouthern.edu
Ming Yang
Kennesaw State University
Zhongxue Chen
Indiana University
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/information-
tech-facpubs
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Information Technology, Department of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Information Technology, Department of - Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Qingzhong, Andrew Sung, Lei Chen, Ming Yang, Zhongxue Chen, Yanxin Liu, Jing Zhang. 2015. "A Method to Detect AAC
Audio Forgery." EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety, 15 (6): 1-7. doi: 10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259141 source:
https://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/icst.mobimedia.2015.259141
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/information-tech-facpubs/39
Authors
Qingzhong Liu, Andrew Sung, Lei Chen, Ming Yang, Zhongxue Chen, Yanxin Liu, and Jing Zhang
This article is available at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/information-tech-
facpubs/39
A Method to Detect AAC Audio Forgery  
 
Qingzhong Liu 
Department of Computer Science 
Sam Houston State University 
 Huntsville, TX 77341, USA  
liu@shsu.edu 
 
Ming Yang 
Department of Information Technology 
Kennesaw State University 
 Marietta, GA 30060, USA  
myang8@kennesaw.edu 
 
 
Andrew H. Sung 
School of Computing 
University of Southern Mississippi 
Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA 
andrew.sung@usm.edu 
 
Yanxin Liu 
Department of Computer Science 
Sam Houston State University 
 Huntsville, TX 77341, USA  
yanxin@shsu.edu 
 
Jing Zhang 
School of Electronic Information 
Engineering, Tianjin University 
 Tianjin, 200072, China 
zhangjing@tju.edu.cn 
 
 
Lei Chen 
Department of Computer Science 
Sam Houston State University 
 Huntsville, TX 77341, USA  
chen@shsu.edu 
 
Zhongxue Chen 
School of Public Health 
Indiana University Bloomington 
 Bloomington, IN 47045, USA  
zc3@indiana.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), a standardized lossy 
compression scheme for digital audio, which was designed to be 
the successor of the MP3 format, generally achieves better sound 
quality than MP3 at similar bit rates. While AAC is also the 
default or standard audio format for many devices and AAC audio 
files may be presented as important digital evidences, the 
authentication of the audio files is highly needed but relatively 
missing. In this paper, we propose a scheme to expose tampered 
AAC audio streams that are encoded at the same encoding bit-
rate. Specifically, we design a shift-recompression based method 
to retrieve the differential features between the re-encoded audio 
stream at each shifting and original audio stream, learning 
classifier is employed to recognize different patterns of 
differential features of the doctored forgery files and original 
(untouched) audio files.  Experimental results show that our 
approach is very promising and effective to detect the forgery of 
the same encoding bit-rate on AAC audio streams. Our study also 
shows that shift recompression-based differential analysis is very 
effective for detection of the MP3 forgery at the same bit rate. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.1 [Multimedia Information Systems]: Audio input/output; 
K.6.m [Miscellaneous]: Insurance and Security  
General Terms 
Algorithms and Security. 
Keywords 
Forgery detection; audio forensics; AAC; same bitrate. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In multimedia forensics, steganalysis and forgery detection are 
two interesting areas with broad impact to each other. While 
multiple promising and well-designed steganalysis methods have 
been proposed and several steganographic systems have been 
successfully steg-analyzed [3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15], it seems that 
the advance in forgery detection falls behind. 
While we enjoy huge volumes of digital multimedia, our 
traditional confidence in the integrity via our eyes and ears has 
also been undermined since doctored pictures, video clips, and 
audio streams are easily manipulated. Generally, tampering 
manipulation in digital media involves several basic operations 
and the detection of these fundamental manipulations and relevant 
forgery has been well studied [1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16]. To our 
knowledge, most study of multimedia forgery detection is focused 
on digital images.  
Some works have been presented to detect the forgery or related 
manipulation in audio streams, including MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3, 
also known as MP3. For example, if two MP3 audio streams 
encoded at different bit-rates are selected in part and composited 
together and encoded in MP3 format, such forgery manipulation 
undergoes double MP3 compression. While we will be able to 
reveal the behavior of double MP3 compression, we may catch 
the forged part in MP3 audio streams. However, if two MP3 audio 
streams encoded at the same bit-rate and composited together and 
encoded in MP3 format with the same bit-rate, the method of 
detecting double MP3 compression does not work [15]. 
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), a lossy audio compression 
scheme, standardized by ISO and IEC, which was designed to be 
the successor of the MP3 format, generally obtains better sound 
quality than MP3 at similar bit rates. AAC is supported on 
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iPhone, iPod, iPad, Nintendo DSi, iTunes, DivX Plus Web Player, 
PlayStation 3, PlayStateion Portable, Wii, Sony Walkman MP3, 
Sony Ericsson, Nokia, Android, Blackberry, and webOS-based 
mobile phones [18]. While AAC audio files widely spread, to our 
knowledge, the literature of the forgery detection of AAC audio 
files is still missing to this date. Inspired by the method to detect 
MP3 forgery by checking offset [16] and the method to detect 
misaligned recompression-based forgery in JPEG images [13], in 
this paper, we propose a scheme to detect the forgery with the 
same bit-rate in AAC audio streams, by designing a shift-
recompression-based differential analysis with learning classifier. 
We describe background and relevant work in section 2, and 
propose our detection method in section 3. Experiments are 
presented in section 4, followed by our conclusion in section 5. 
2.  BACKGROUND AND AAC 
TAMPERING 
AAC is a standardized, lossy digital audio compression scheme. It 
was developed with the cooperation and contributions of 
companies mainly including Dolby, Fraunhofer (FhG), AT&T, 
Sony and Nokia, and was officially declared an international 
standard by the Moving Pictures Experts Group in April of 1997. 
AAC was promoted as the successor to MP3 for audio coding at 
medium to high bitrates. It follows the same basic coding 
paradigm as Layer-3 including high frequency resolution filter 
bank, non-uniform quantization, Huffman coding, iteration loop 
structure using analysis by-synthesis but improves on Layer-3 in a 
lot of details and uses new coding tools for improved quality at 
low bit-rates. Its popularity is currently maintained by it being the 
default iTunes codec, the media player which powers iPod, the 
most popular digital audio player on the market. Furthermore, the 
iTunes Music Store, whose sales account for 85% of the market 
for legal online downloads, sells AAC-encoded songs 
(encapsulated with FairPlay Digital Rights Management) 
Compared to MP3, AAC improves the following aspects: 
1) More sample frequencies (from 8 kHz to 96 kHz) than 
MP3 (16 kHz to 48 kHz); 
2) Up to 48 channels (MP3 supports up to two channels in 
MPEG-1 mode and up to 5.1 channels in MPEG-2 
mode); 
3) Arbitrary bit-rates and variable frame length. 
Standardized constant bit rate with bit reservoir; 
4) Higher efficiency and simpler filter bank (rather than 
MP3’s hybrid coding, AAC utilizes a pure MDCT); 
5) Higher coding efficiency for stationary signals (AAC 
uses a block size of 1024 or 960 samples, allowing 
more efficient coding than MP3’s 576 sample blocks); 
6) Higher coding accuracy for transient signals (AAC uses 
a block size of 128 or 120 samples, allowing more 
accurate coding than MP3’s 192 sample blocks); 
7) Can use Kaiser-Bessel derived window function to 
eliminate spectral leakage at the expense of widening 
the main lobe; 
8) Much better handling of audio frequencies above 16 
kHz; 
9) More flexible joint stereo (different methods can be 
used in different frequency ranges); 
10) Adds additional modules (tools) to increase 
compression efficiency: temporal noise shaping (TNS) 
[20], Backwards Prediction, Perceptual Noise 
Substitution (PNS) [21], etc. 
11) Improved Huffman Coding: In AAC, coding by 
quadruples of frequency lines applied more often. In 
addition, the assignment of Huffman code tables to 
coder partitions can be much more flexible. 
Figure 1 shows the general processing flow in MPEG-2 AAC 
encoding. 
 
 
Figure 1. AAC flowing chart [22] 
 
Regarding AAC audio tampering, generally an original AAC 
audio signal is decoded into temporal domain, the doctoring 
occurs at the temporal domain by inserting or removing some 
voice signals, and the modified audio signal is encoded to AAC 
audio format. If the bitrate of inserted audio signal fragment is 
different from the bitrate of original AAC audio signal; or the 
bitrate used for encoding modified audio signal is different from 
the bitrate of original AAC audio signal, the tampering may be 
exposed by revealing the different bitrates once used in the 
control process. However, if the bitrates are the same, the 
detection becomes difficult.  
Our task targets on the detection of the AAC audio forgery 
encoded at the same bitrate used for the original AAC audio 
stream. 
3. PROPOSED DETECTION METHOD 
3.1 Related Study in Image Forgery Detection 
Our proposed approach is based on our previous work in detecting 
image forgery, therefore, we described the feature extraction for 
image forgery detection below [13]. 
1) Decode an JPEG image under examination to spatial 
domain, which is denoted by matrix S(i,j) (i=1, 2, …, M; j 
= 1, 2 …, N); 
2) Shift the matrix S(i,j) by d1 rows and d2 columns in the 
spatial domain, (d1, d2) { }(7,7),… (1,0), 7), (0,,…  (0,1),∈  
and generate a shifted spatial image S΄( d1, d2), S΄( d1, d2) = 
S(i- d1, j- d2)(i= d1+1, d1+2, …, M; j= d2+1, q+ d2, …, N),  
then compress the shifted spatial image S΄( d1, d2) to JPEG 
format at the same quantization matrix; 
3) Decode the shifted JPEG image to spatial domain, denoted 
by a matrix S΄΄( d1, d2); 
4) Calculate the difference D (d1, d2)= S΄( d1, d2) - S΄΄( d1, d2); 
5) Shift-recompression based ReShuffle Characteristic 
features (SRSC) on the region of interest R, SRSCR are 
defined by: 

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Where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }7,7,...,0,1,7,0,...,1,0, 21 ∈dd .There are a total 
of 63 features for each R. 
If an image was cropped under the misalignment by p rows and q 
columns, mod (p, 8) ≠ 0 or mod (q, 8) ≠0, 0≤p≤8, 0≤q≤8, and then 
recompressed at the same quantization matrix to the original 
JPEG image, we expect that the SRSC features will be distinct 
due to the misalignment, and the values of p and q can be 
determined by the SRSC features. Figure 2 shows an original 
JPEG image (a) and a cropped image with misalignment p=4 and 
q=4 (b). The SRSC features from original image and the 
misaligned recompressed image (p=4, q=4), respectively, are 
shown in (c), and (d). The circle highlights the major differences 
of SRSC features between the original and manipulated image. It 
shows that SRSC features may be effective in exposing the 
misaligned operations that are encoded with the same 
quantization matrix. 
 
 
 
(a) An original image 
 
 
 
(b). a cropped image (p=4, q=4) 
(c) SRSC (original image) 
 
(e) SRSC(cropped, p=4, q=4) 
Figure 2. A comparison of SRSC features from an original JPEG image and three cropped JPEG images. X-label shows the SRSC 
feature index and y-label indicates the value [13]. 
 
3.2 Proposed Approach to Detecting AAC 
Audio Forgery 
As pointed out in [13], JPEG compression generally generates 
block artifacts. We surmise that similar to JPEG compression, 
AAC audio compression also introduces block (frame) artifacts. 
While two AAC audio files are manipulated together, or some 
part is removed from an AAC audio file in temporal domain, and 
doctored audio data are re-encoded in AAC format at the same bit 
rate, the original block artifacts are generally undermined, in 
other words, original block switching structure will be reshuffled 
with a part of the neighbor blocks. By revealing such reshuffling 
manipulation, we may locate the doctored areas in the AAC audio 
forgery that was encoded at the same bit rate. According to our 
previous work in image forgery detection [13], we propose a 
shift-recompression-based differential analysis to detect the 
forgery in AAC audio streams with the same compression bit rate, 
described as follows. 
Shift-Recompression-based Differential Analysis Algorithm 
1. Decode the examined AAC audio stream to temporal 
domain, denoted by a matrix S(i,j) (i=0,1, 2, …, M; j 
indicates the number of channel of the audio signal); 
2. For AAC stationary audio signal, each frame contains 1024 
time-domain samples. Allegedly, each frame stands alone 
and does not depend on previous frames (whereas many 
perceptual audio codecs such MP3 overlap data with the 
previous frame).  
3. For t=1:1023 
a) Shift the matrix S(i,j) by t samples in the temporal 
domain (t=1,2,…1023). A shifted temporal WAV signal 
S΄(i, j, t) is produced. S΄(i, j, t) = S(i-t, j), i= t, t+1, t+2, 
…, M; 
b) Encode the shifted temporal signal S΄( i, j, t) to AAC 
format at the same bit rate; 
c) Decode the encoded audio signal from the above step to 
temporal domain, denoted by S΄΄( i, j, t); 
d) Calculate the difference D(i, j, t)= S΄( i, j,  t) - S΄΄( i, j,  
t); 
e) Shift-recompression based reshuffle characteristic 
features (SRSC) are given by: 
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We obtain 1023 SRSC features for a stationary AAC audio file 
since t = 1, 2, ..., 1023.  
While AAC audio stream are tampered in temporal domain and 
original frame structures are generally broken, by checking the 
SRSC feature under each different shift-recompression, we 
surmise that untouched SRSC features and tampered SRSC 
features are different, especially at the corresponding shift. As a 
result, the manipulation may be exposed. 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
4.1 Detection of Cropping and Recompression 
To verify our proposed shift-recompression-based differential 
analysis, we select 1000 never compressed WAV files; each file is 
in the length of 20 seconds. These WAV files are compressed in 
AAC format by using FAAC encoder, which is based on the 
original ISO MPEG reference code [19]. To simulate the shift-
recompression of AAC audio forgery manipulation, AAC audio 
files are decoded into temporal domain and cropped by different 
samples at the beginning of the audio signals, then re-encoded in 
AAC format at the same bit rate. In our study, we tried to produce 
the cropping database at each possible cropping, or the number of 
samples removed is set from 1 to 1023, however, the time-
consuming is too high to complete. Therefore, in our experiments, 
the numbers of the samples cropped are only set as 5, 50, 200, 
400, 480, 512, 750, 900, and 1000, respectively. 1023 SRSC 
features are extracted from 1000 untouched AAC audio files and 
from the nine categories of doctored AAC audio files. Figure 3 
shows the SRSC features extracted from an untouched AAC 
audio file and from the cropping by 50 samples and the cropping 
by 900 samples individually and recompressed versions. 
We apply a popular SVM technique LibSVM [17] with a linear 
kernel for training and testing. One hundred experiments are 
performed for training and testing. In each experiment, 60% 
feature sets from each category are randomly selected for training 
and the remainders are used for testing. The mean testing of the 
confusion matrix over 100 experiments are shown by Table 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. SRSC features of original AAC audio (a) and the AAC audio once cropped by 50 samples (b) and by 900 samples (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Confusion matrix on testing sets (mean values, %) by using LibSVM with linear kernel over 100 experiments. 
                   Prediction 
Truth   
untouched Manipulation (cropped by) 5 50 200 400 480 512 750 900 1000 
untouched 99.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manipulation 
(Cropped by) 
5 3.4 96.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 1.8 0 98.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
200 2.1 0 0 97.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
400 1.5 0 0 0 98.6 0 0 0 0 0 
480 1.2 0 0 0 0 98.8 0 0 0 0 
512 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 97.7 0 0 0 
750 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98.1 0 0 
900 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97.7 0 
1000 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97.9 
 
4.2 Detection of AAC Forgery 
In this type of experiments, we randomly select 200 AAC audio 
files, and remove a few audio samples in the middle, with the 
block switch offset by 100, 300, 500, 700, and 900 samples, then 
encode the doctored audio signals into AAC format at the same 
bit rate. There are total of 1000 doctored AAC audio files. We 
apply shift-recompression-based differential analysis to each 
audio file (including untouched and doctored audio files), each 
audio file is equally divided into six segments, as a result, 1200 
untouched segments and 3000 touched segments are obtained.  
SRSC features are extracted from each segment, in order to 
discriminate the doctored audio files from untouched files, and 
identify the doctored areas. The experimental design is the same 
to the process described in III.A. Table 2 shows the confusion 
matrix with the experimental results over 100 experiments. 
Figure 4 shows the SRSC features extracted from the six parts of 
an original AAC audio file (first row) and from the six part of the 
doctored AAC audio file with the forgery taking place on the 
middle. The comparison show that the first three parts of the 
original audio and doctored audio are similar, but the pattern of 
the SRSC features from the last three parts are different, which 
approximately reveals the forged area in doctored AAC audio 
stream in the middle. 
 
Table 2. Confusion matrix on testing sets (mean values, %) by using LibSVM with linear kernel over 100 experiments. 
                   Prediction 
Truth    
untouched 
forgery (shifted by) 
100 300 500 700 900 
untouched 98.8 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
forgery 
(shifted 
by) 
100 1.2 98.7 0 0 0 0.0 
300 0.8 0.1 99.1 0 0 0.0 
500 0.6 0 0.0 99.4 0.0 0.0 
700 0.8 0 0.0 0 99.2 0.0 
900 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0 98.6 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 4. The SRSC features extracted from an original AAC audio file and from manipulated AAC audio file (doctoring in the middle). 
 
 
(a) Original MP3 
 
 
(b). MP3 cropped by 550 samples and encoded at the same bit rate 
Figure 5. SRSC features of original (a) and manipulated MP3 files (b) 
 
4.3 Discussion and Future Study 
Although our experiments presented above do not examine all 
possibility of AAC audio forgery due to the very high 
computational cost (it is very time-consuming to examine of all 
possible forgery shifted by 1023 positions), by simulating part 
cases of AAC audio forgery at a reasonable computational cost, 
our experimental results do verify the effectiveness of our 
proposed shift-recompression-based approach to detecting AAC 
audio forgery of the same bit rate. The detection accuracy is very 
promising. 
It is worth noting that shift-recompression-based method is 
effective not only for detecting AAC audio forgery, but also for 
detecting MP3 audio forgery on the same bit rate.  Figure 5 shows 
an example of SRSC features extracted from an untouched MP3 
audio file and a doctored MP3 file. The difference is that each 
MP3 frame contains 576 time-domain samples, therefore, the 
feature set only consists of 575 features, not 1023 features. 
Our previous studys shows that image complexity and audio 
signal complexy [11, 15, 23] may play important role in 
evaluating the detection performance. In the future, we will exam 
the detection peformance under different audio signal complexity, 
and explore new audio forgery detection methods at a lower 
computational cost. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
There was no literature before targeting on the forgery detection 
of AAC audio streams on the same compression bit-rate. In this 
paper, we propose a shift-recompression-based differential 
analysis to detecting AAC audio forgery with learning classifiers. 
Although our method is pretty straightforward, experimental 
results show that our approach is quite promising and effective. 
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